oss-sec mailing list archives
Re: CVE request: TLS CBC padding timing flaw in various SSL / TLS implementations
From: Vincent Danen <vdanen () redhat com>
Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2013 11:22:39 -0700
* [2013-02-05 12:45:48 -0500] cve-assign () mitre org wrote:
cc'ing cve-assign to see if they can provide some guidance here. I also noticed that OpenSSL has a CVE for this (I'm assuming that the CVE-2012-2686 issue is _not_ the same thing, but that CVE-2013-0169 is this issue). Since it's a weakness in TLS/DTLS itself, from my understanding, and not necessarily in a particular implementation, I'm not sure if this qualifies as one CVE for the weakness, or if it needs one per implementation. MITRE, can someone provide some guidance on this?[ This is mostly directed to Red Hat at this point. We'll expand to the other recipients or vendors later. ] We're not exactly sure that MITRE has the next step here. A CVE exists, CVE-2013-0169, that was issued by the Red Hat CNA. When the CVE assignment was made, presumably one or more persons at Red Hat had a working understanding of what the name CVE-2013-0169 means. (For example: was the CVE assigned with a multi-vendor scope in mind? Was the CVE assigned to cover the entirety of the content of the www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/TLStiming.pdf research paper?) MITRE would, in general, want to preserve this original meaning if it makes sense to do that. Because there's no specific statement on this list about what CVE-2013-0169 means, we'd next go to https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2013-0169 to see if that may be a canonical statement of what CVE-2013-0169 means. But there's nothing there yet. Before offering a guess from MITRE, we'll wait for some more information.
Yes, you're right, this did come from our pool. We did provide this CVE to the OpenSSL team (at the time the request was made we did not receive any disclosure on the issue and were not aware of other affected implementations). The intention was then just for OpenSSL (perhaps under the assumption this was for an OpenSSL-specific issue, again, unaware of the details of the flaw). If MITRE wants to use it as a general name for the other affected implementations (GnuTLS, NSS, etc.) as well, and not just OpenSSL, that's fine. We have not allocated any CVEs for these other implementations, nor did we provide this CVE name to the authors of the paper. The long and short of it is a private (unspecified) request came from the OpenSSL team and we provided it, so there was no specific intention on our part as to how the name was used or what it meant. I hope that clarifies things a bit. We have no particular preference either way, so we'll leave this to your discretion. Thanks. --Vincent Danen / Red Hat Security Response Team
Current thread:
- CVE request: TLS CBC padding timing flaw in various SSL / TLS implementations Matthias Weckbecker (Feb 05)
- Re: CVE request: TLS CBC padding timing flaw in various SSL / TLS implementations Matthias Weckbecker (Feb 05)
- Re: CVE request: TLS CBC padding timing flaw in various SSL / TLS implementations Matthias Weckbecker (Feb 05)
- Re: CVE request: TLS CBC padding timing flaw in various SSL / TLS implementations Marcus Meissner (Feb 05)
- Re: CVE request: TLS CBC padding timing flaw in various SSL / TLS implementations Vincent Danen (Feb 05)
- Re: CVE request: TLS CBC padding timing flaw in various SSL / TLS implementations cve-assign (Feb 05)
- Re: CVE request: TLS CBC padding timing flaw in various SSL / TLS implementations Vincent Danen (Feb 05)
- Re: CVE request: TLS CBC padding timing flaw in various SSL / TLS implementations cve-assign (Feb 05)
- Re: CVE request: TLS CBC padding timing flaw in various SSL / TLS implementations cve-assign (Feb 05)
- Re: CVE request: TLS CBC padding timing flaw in various SSL / TLS implementations Hanno Böck (Feb 07)
- Re: CVE request: TLS CBC padding timing flaw in various SSL / TLS implementations Kurt Seifried (Feb 07)
- Re: CVE request: TLS CBC padding timing flaw in various SSL / TLS implementations cve-assign (Feb 07)
- Re: CVE request: TLS CBC padding timing flaw in various SSL / TLS implementations Vincent Danen (Feb 05)
- Re: CVE request: TLS CBC padding timing flaw in various SSL / TLS implementations Matthias Weckbecker (Feb 05)